Reform: Will They Just Collapse?

For many Labour and Tory politicians and even some on the left there is a comforting assumption about the rise of Reform UK. The argument runs that once Reform councillors are exposed to the realities of office they will collapse under the weight of their own incompetence. Their candidates are often politically inexperienced, organisationally weak and ideologically incoherent. Once voters see them actually running councils, the theory goes, they will be thrown out as quickly as they arrived.

Nigel Farage, will he collapse?

There is certainly evidence for parts of this argument. Reports have already emerged of chaos, infighting and poor organisation among some newly elected Reform representatives. But the wider European experience suggests the situation is more dangerous than simple implosion. The history of the far right across Europe shows that incompetence in office does not necessarily destroy these parties. Sometimes it strengthens them.

Germany’s Alternative for Germany, the AfD, is one of the clearest examples. When the AfD first broke through into local government it was widely mocked for its amateurism and instability. Many councillors had little administrative or political experience. Local branches were thin and disorganised. Internal factional warfare was constant. Researchers examining the AfD’s local growth repeatedly found that the party often focused less on practical municipal politics than on symbolic culture war issues around nationalism, immigration and identity however the party continued to grow.

The expectation among much of the German establishment was that once exposed to scrutiny the AfD would discredit itself. Instead, scandals, chaos and extremism often failed to dent its support. The party survived allegations involving Russian and Chinese influence, repeated internal splits, open flirtations with Nazi rhetoric and continual controversies surrounding candidates and officials. None of this prevented it becoming a major force in German politics.

Part of the reason is that many far right voters are not primarily looking for competent administrators. They are voting against the political establishment itself. Support for parties such as the AfD often rests less on confidence in their ability to govern than on anger over immigration, economic decline, liberal politics and distrust of existing institutions. In that context, accusations of incompetence or extremism can even reinforce support, because they are interpreted as proof that the establishment fears or is trying to suppress the outsider party.

This is one of the central mistakes often made by liberals and sections of the centre left. They assume voters support the far right in the same way they support mainstream parties, evaluating policies and administrative competence in a rational managerial fashion. But insurgent right wing populism frequently operates according to a different political logic. Its supporters may already assume the system is corrupt or hostile. Every scandal becomes further evidence that elites, journalists and institutions are conspiring against “ordinary people”.

This does not mean far right parties are invulnerable. European history contains many examples of fragmentation and collapse. Austria’s Freedom Party repeatedly entered government only to be consumed by corruption scandals, splits and internal warfare. Yet even there the story did not end with permanent defeat. After periods of apparent destruction the party repeatedly recovered and rebuilt itself.

The same pattern can be seen elsewhere. In France the National Rally spent decades using local government as a base from which to normalise itself politically. Municipal office helped it recruit activists, build patronage networks and cultivate a layer of apparently respectable local politicians. Some councils performed badly and lost support. But the overall effect was to embed the far right more deeply within French political life.

That is the danger with Reform. Even if many councillors prove ineffective, the party may still gain something more important from local office: legitimacy and implantation. Every council chamber seat, every committee position and every local media appearance helps normalise a politics rooted in nationalism, anti migrant scapegoating and hostility to the left.

There are nevertheless real vulnerabilities. Reform appears organisationally thinner than many established European far right parties. It lacks the deeper activist structures built over decades by formations such as the AfD or National Rally. Its coalition also appears unstable, bringing together anti migrant nationalism, libertarian anti state politics, culture war populism and disillusioned former Conservatives. Such combinations can fracture easily once confronted with the realities of administration.

Rapid electoral growth can also overwhelm organisational capacity. This has happened repeatedly across Europe. Weak vetting leads to extremist candidates and public scandals, personal rivalries intensify, elected representatives defect or become isolated. 

But the European evidence suggests that chaos alone is unlikely to make Reform disappear. The deeper question is whether the social conditions producing support for the right continue. If economic insecurity, political alienation and hostility towards mainstream politics persist, then administrative incompetence may not be enough to break Reform’s base.

Building active resistance to them and their racism is therefore vital.